Privatizations are commonly associated with an increase in efficiency due to a stronger focus on profit maximization and less agency conflicts because the management does not have to serve political objectives anymore. This paper discusses whether SIPs generate positive announcement returns because of increased efficiency after the ownership transition. We apply a market model event-study methodology based on a sample of 134 SIPs in the 1979-2003 period. We identify significantly negative CAARs between -0.125% and -1.766% and find that firm and offering size, the proportion of secondary shares issued within the SIP as well as the market environment have a negative impact on announcement returns. In contrast, the negative CAARs are less distinctive for enterprises that had prior SIPs.
I. Introduction
A number of studies analyze the returns of initial public offerings of divested state-owned enterprises as well as returns to subsequent share issuances, 32 e.g., Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) or Jones, Megginson, Nash and Netter (1999) . Prior research has found significant positive returns which are often attributed to substantial underpricing. These observations are reflected by Altinilic and Hansen (2003) or Laurin, Borardman and Vining (2004) , who argue that governments deliberately underprice initial and subsequent share issue privatizations (SIP) in 32 Prior research distinguishes between two methods of privatization through a sale of ownership claims in state property for cash payments: On the one hand, the government may sell the state-owned enterprise to individual, strategic or groups of investors. On the other hand, some or all of a government's stake in a state-owned enterprise is sold to investors through a public share offering. We define this process as share issue privatizations (SIPs), whereas some or all of a government's stakes are sold via a public offering. Although this process is similar to IPOs of privately held enterprises, the government's motives are different. Megginson and Netter (2001) claim that the motivation for SIPs is to raise money and to respond to political objectives. By contrast, private offerings are structured primarily to raise proceeds. We refer to the offering of a government's stakes in a state-owned enterprise for the first time as initial share issue privatization, while subsequent equity offerings are defined as seasoned or subsequent share issue privatization.
order to signal that they do not intend to redistribute the value of shareholders' investments and to align shareholders' interests with those of the privatizing government. However, if underpricing is a reliable signal for stating that governments will not interfere in a firm's operating activities in the future, then, as suggested by Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) , a SIPs should be underpriced more strongly compared to IPOs and seasoned equity offerings (SEO) of firms in the private sector. In turn, this expectation should be incorporated into stock prices at the day the information on a subsequent equity offering of a SEO becomes public.
Several studies document that the announcement of an issuance of seasoned equity for non-state-owned enterprises is associated with average negative abnormal returns between -2.00% and -3.00%. 33 Even though theses findings may not be strictly comparable with the announcements of a SIPs, because private-sector SEOs might be underpriced for different reasons, one may expect the announcement of a subsequent share issuance (of secondary or primary shares) during a privatization process to result in negative market reactions. Asymmetric information is regarded as one reason for the negative market reaction as outside investors usually do not exhibit the same information about the firm's true value than inside investors. Furthermore, the government's motives to privatize are ambiguous.
A rich body of literature on post-privatization performance has emerged over time providing evidence that profitability, operating efficiency, output as well as the financial performance increase after a reduction of state ownership. 34 Barberis, Boycko, Shleifer, and Tsukanova (1996), Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (1999) and more recent Jelic, Briston, and Aussenegg (2003) demonstrate that the rationale behind these empirical findings is primarily to be found in changes in the ownership structure and the board of directors. Profit-oriented shareholders participating in SIPs processes encourage managers to the primary goal of shareholder value, whereas, in line with Moore (1992), purely state-owned enterprises (SOE) may pursue multiple aims related to diverse political objectives, for instance, job security. Hence, one can assume that the announcement of a SIP, and, more specifically, the direct (SIPs with secondary shares only) or indirect (SIPs with secondary and/or primary shares) reduction of state ownership, generate positive announcement returns.
Overall, the valuation effects associated with an announcement of a SIP are ambiguous. To the extent that an intensified monitoring by capital markets result in performance improvements, announcements of SIPs should cause positive valuation effects. By contrast, a negative market reaction reflects the market's perception of the degree to which the government intends to redistribute firm value after privatization, i.e., affect the value of the firm through policy changes in regulation, taxation and so forth. Since the valuation effect of SIP announcements is ambiguous, we enlarge the body of research by analyzing the market reaction to announcements of SIPs. Consequently, two questions arise: First, do share prices react to SIP announcements? Second, if valuation effects are observable, are they caused by an expected increase of performance or by the market's perception of a government's motives for privatization?
Our study design applies a market model eventstudy methodology based on a sample of 134 SIPs, which are conducted by 82 enterprises from 15 Western European countries between 1979 and 2003. We identify negative cumulated average abnormal 34 Studies documenting an improvement of profitability include Boubakri and Cosset (1998) announcement returns between -0.125% and -1.766% which can largely be explained by firm and offering size as well as the market environment. In contrast, the negative CAARs are less distinctive for enterprises that had prior SIPs
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: First, we explore the manifold theoretical and empirical background against which our investigation is organized. Section III deals with the data and the methodology used in our event-study analysis. Subsequently, section IV describes the results of the univariate analysis. Section V discusses the results of our event-study, while section VI presents the results of the cross-sectional regression. Finally, section VII concludes with a summary and discussion of the results.
II. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
It is usually assumed that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are less efficient compared to private ones due to the fact that they have to cater to the objectives of politicians and are not able to pursue the aim of maximizing efficiency. In line with Villalonga (2000), three distinct theoretical approaches (Agency and Property Rights Theory, Public Choice Theory and the Organizational Theory) can be made to explain why efficiency of SOEs is lower. Most important, as proposed in this analysis, managers of SOEs attempt to maximize their private benefits rather than the utility function of the government [De Alessi (1969) ]. Furthermore, reducing ownership in SOEs is impossible for individuals prior to an equity offering. Therefore, in order to explain different levels of efficiency one has to consider the agency conflict between owners and managers as well as the absence of a market for corporate control. This leads to the objectives of the Agency and Property Rights Theory. However, the Public Choice Theory assumes that politicians are self-interested agents who aim at maximizing their own utility. Third, Villalonga (2000) suggests that the Organizational Theory explains differences between public and private firms with regard to efficiency by analyzing the SOE inherent organizational characteristics. The overviews of theoretical and empirical studies provided by Villalonga (2000) and Megginson and Netter (2001) show that considerable research energy has been invested into determining what factors may explain differences in efficiency between privately and stateowned firms. Overall evidence consistently shows that privately owned enterprises provide superior degrees of efficiency.
Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) highlight the problem of inefficient state-owned enterprises and argue that efficiency could be enhanced after privatization. A privatization transfers several control rights over a firm's resources to managers who are willing to meet the interest of the shareholders. Therefore, vote maximizing politicians who have a fundamental interest in employment in order to gain support of trade-unions in elections have to compensate managers for excess employment via subsidies. Budget restrictions for politicians are the principle reasons why a reduction of excess employment and a restructuring of the firms will be achieved after a privatization [Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) ]. A privatization will subject managers to profit maximization, since shareholders are profit-oriented, whereas, in line with Moore (1992), a state-owned enterprises pursues multiple objectives, such as keeping employment rates high. Moreover, a rich body of empirical studies on postprivatization performance has emerged over time, applying a broad set of sophisticated methods and indicators to measure possible performance variations of newly privatized firms. Empirical investigations of D'Souza, Megginson and Nash (2005) and the research pooled in Megginson and Netter (2001) , document that firms experience significant increases in efficiency and profitability due to privatization because managers are monitored by the capital market [Boubakri and Cosset (1998) Biais and Perotti (2002) provide a theoretical foundation for underpricing, based on a government's ability to signal that they do not intend to redistribute the value of the shareholders' investment, i.e., affect the value of the firm through policy changes in regulation, taxation and so forth.
Perotti (1995) categorizes governments as either populist or committed governments and only the latter can resist the politically valuable option of reallocating firm value to a specific constituency after a privatization. Since a populist government would also pretend to pursue the privatization process, a committed government requires a credible signal, whereas ‖[...] a partial sale and (possibly) its underpricing are signals of commitment‖ [Perotti (1995), p. 848)]. This approach implies that the consequences of subsequent interference also affect the government that is still the biggest shareholder after a gradual sale [Perotti (1995) and Jones, Megginson, Nash and Netter (1999)]. Furthermore, successive selling of small proportions of the governmental stake bears the risk that the motives of a populist governments become public, which reduces the proceeds achievable in subsequent share issuances.
In contrast, divesting SOE via SIP leads to the problem that the government has to assure that it intends to transfer the right of disposal. However, underpricing is a reliable signal when it is used by a committed government in order to capture the economic benefits of a privatization. Hence, the level of underpricing necessary is related to the investors' expectations about future policy and ‖[...] the secondary market will place a higher value on a firm if the government credibly signals commitment‖ [Jones, Megginson, Nash and Netter (1999) ]. In addition, to signal a government's identity with the privatization process and to overcome uncertainty about future policy, underpricing of an IPO or subsequent SIPs may provide the opportunity to maximize the present value of the total net proceeds from all equity offerings [Laurin, The empirical studies reviewed provide evidence that returns of subsequent SIPs are positive and that the decision to privatize, i.e., the time pattern for later SIPs is made by politicians or managers who exhibit superior information of the firm. Assuming managers to act in the interest of their shareholders, a strong incentive exists to issue new equity, when the capital market evaluates shares above the value which would be justified by the firm's prospects. Consequently, the announcement of issuing stocks should result in a re-evaluation of the share price by the investors [Asquith and Mullins (1986) ]. Therefore, stock prices of partially privatized firms should decline when the government is willing to sell its shares.
Concluding from the arguments mentioned above, the transition of ownership should result in an improvement of operating and financial performance. Thus, the announcement of a further equity offering should cause a positive market reaction. In contrast, underpricing of initial or subsequent share issuances, information asymmetries as well as agency problems should have a negative impact on share prices. Hence, the question can be raised which effect will predominate: The empirical research supports the existence of widespread negative returns related to SEO announcements of non state-owned enterprises. Prior research on non-state-owned enterprises provides evidence that an announcement of an equity issuance results in a decline of share prices between -0.82% and -3.56% within two days the information becomes public (see table 1 ). 35 But to what extent are these findings transferable to SIPs and more generally, what affects announcement returns in a SIP process? Following the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), the announcement of an issuance will cause no price effect because arbitrage will equalize stock prices and the prices of stocks' close substitutes. Thus, sales of large blocks of shares will only cause a price reaction because the stock is priced relative to its substitutes. If close substitutes are not available, then, according to the price pressure hypothesis, an excess supply leads to a negative price movement [Akhigbe and Harikumar (1996) ]. Hess and Frost (1982) provide empirical support for this theory.
Allocating income rights to the capital market can result in an improvement of a firm's profitability because of a reduced likelihood of political interference. Faccio, Masulis and McConnell (2006) find empirical support that firms with small governmental influence outperform enterprises facing interference by politicians. In this context we assume governments to be at least one of the companies' biggest blockholders, who usually possess superior information about the companies' prospects. Therefore, a sale of shares conjectures the information that the government trades on an informational advantage. By selling a large proportion of shares, the government may communicate a negative signal about the firm's future cash flows. This argument corresponds to the one adduced by Fidrmuc, Goeren and Renneboog (2006) to explain negative market reactions to the announcement of insider stock sales. Furthermore, the government may be a populist government as defined by Jones, Megginson, Nash and Netter (1999) that faces the problem of liquidity needs for their redistributive policy. Thus, the negative signal of a government that sells its shares should be evaluated by the capital market with respect to the firm's cash flow [Jones, Megginson, Nash and Netter (1999)]. 36 Additionally, the findings of Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Loughran and Ritter (1997) provide empirical support that firms take advantage of a current overvaluation of their shares to issue equity; then, perceived overvaluation leads to a subsequent negative market reaction if a seasoned equity offering is announced. The reason for the ‖window of opportunity problem‖ can be found in an asymmetric 35 Most of the results correspond to an event-window starting one day prior the announcement day and ending one day thereafter. 36 Conversely, director's put their own wealth at stake and their signal of selling shares is therefore less informative, if they act also due to liquidity needs [Fidrmuc, Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) who asserted reduced discount rates and behavioral finance effects, e.g., herding, as possible reasons. Therefore, we would expect governments to increase the relative as well as the absolute number of shares during periods of high pre-issuance market conditions because of reduced information costs:
Do abnormal returns associated with sales of ownership claims depend on market conditions?
Given the decision to sell parts of an enterprise, the level of information asymmetry as to politicians' intention to privatize should decrease in case of a seasoned SIP because the potential risk of redistribution of firm value by politicians will be reduced as described above. D'Mello, Tawatnuntachai and Yaman (2003) observe a relationship between the sequence of SEOs and the uncertainty about a firm's value. They provide evidence for less unfavorable announcement reactions because of declining level of asymmetric information. Here, the rationale is that prevalently issuers experience lower information costs due to the issuers heightened reputation of not taking advantage of new shareholders, i.e., not to pursue multiple aims related to diverse political objectives:
The level of asymmetric information associated with SIP depends on offering frequency. The market is less concerned about successive SIP announcements of firms. Conversely, the market is more concerned about the announcement of the first equity issuance after the IPO. Issuing equity provides the possibility of issuing not only secondary shares but also new equity which ceteris paribus improves the financial situation of the enterprise. In addition, this effect should be supported by an increase in profitability, which is to be expected after privatization [Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh (1994) and Alexandre and Charreaux (2004) ].
However, the impact of the amount of secondary shares issued in a SIP process on announcement reactions may be of a dual nature: On the one hand, selling secondary shares only conveys the market's conviction of a reduction of political connection. This should be associated with a positive market reaction. Moreover, Alexandre and Charreaux (2004) argue that a retraction of the government and the issuance of new equity should also foster profitability due to the reduced likelihood of bankruptcy. However, a relative decrease in financial leverage due to a raise of new capital may cause declining monitoring activities of creditors [Jensen (1986) ], which should result in negative announcement effects. On the other hand, the capital market may perceive a high amount of secondary shares as an indicator that the current stock price is high relative to managers' assessment of the firm's prospects, i.e., selling overpriced shares [Asquith and Mullins (1986) ]. Consequently, this should results in a negative market reaction.
The abnormal market reaction associated with SIP announcements depends on the proportion of secondary shares issued. A high (low) proportion of secondary shares should be associated with a negative (positive) market reaction. Examining market reactions to subsequent equity offerings, Jensen (1986) draw the conclusion that managers act in their own interest by enhancing the assets under their management. The rationale is that managers even risk the consequence of a declining equity value, i.e., investment in projects with negative net present values, in order to increase the total assets controlled by them. In general, large free cash flows as well as lower financial constraints are mentioned as the origin of the over-investment problem in diversified firms [e.g., Berger and Ofek (1995) ]. However, the negative market reaction caused by this agency conflict may be attenuated if the firm exhibits substantially growth opportunities. In line with previous research, the existence of growth opportunities induces less negative market reactions [e.g., Denis (1994) ]. Interestingly, the study conducted by Denis (1994) does not detect any relationship between announcement effects and the profitability of new investment projects. Yet, firms with an optimistic assessment of their future prospects, as reflected in high market-to-book-ratios, should experience a less negative announcement effect:
The For an inclusion in the final sample, we require a firm's announcement of a privatization via SIP to satisfy at least one of the following criteria: (1) the government announced an equity offering, (2) the enterprise announced a share issuance, (3) a state-owned holding company announced or accomplished a stock disposition, (4) the government authorized a further reduction in their stake, (5) the government actually sold a further stake or approved an offering of a further stake in the near future, (6) the shareholders agreed to a further SIPs or (7) an investment bank acknowledged that shares had been sold.
For sample refinement purposes, initial public offerings and events of uncertain announcement days are excluded from the sample. As our research interest centers on examining the effects of seasoned share issue privatization announcements, we require all sample firms to have stock returns throughout all event and estimation periods. Since Thomson Financial DataStream does not provide share prices for every enterprise in the initial sample, our data set is reduced by 47 transactions. Moreover, in order to avoid confounding events within the event windows as well as defining different lengths of estimation periods, the final sample was pared down to 82 enterprises that conducted 134 SIPs.
B. Control Variables
We use the Thomson Financial DataStream INDC3 code to classify the firms of the final sample into ten industries: basic industry (BASIC), cyclical consumption industry (CYCGD), cyclical services (CYSER), general industry (GENIN), information technology (ITECH), non-cyclical consumption industry (NCYCG), non-cyclical services (NCYSR), resources (RESOR), financial services (TOTLF), and utilities (UTILS). As more than half of the SIPs originate from the non-cyclical consumption, the resource or the financial services industry, we construct the binary variables Financial Services and Utility to capture a firm's affiliation to the financial or utility industry.
Firms that experience political interference, i.e due to changes in the regulatory environment, may also suffer from an increase in their systematic risks [Schwert (1981) ]. In order to control for a company's risk, we include the systematic risk factor obtained from the market model regression in the estimation period.
The probability to receive political attention seems to be greater for large firms. To control for firms' size, we include the company's market value at the announcement day, which is obtained from Thomson Financial DataStream. The absolute and the relative value of shares issued as well as the proportion of secondary shares offered comes also from Thomson Financial DataStream and is based on the information of the type of equity issuance. Furthermore, we include the proxy SIP-frequency to indicate whether the enterprise had prior SIPs (coded as zero) or if the firm conducts its first subsequent equity offering (coded as one). 37 We use the relative change in the number of employees one year prior to the announcement to capture reorganization activities. Additionally, we include the market-tobook value at the announcement day to measure the market's perception of the firm's future prospects. Finally, we apply two measures to control for the overall market environment: the mean return and the standard deviation of the benchmark index during the estimation period.
C. Event-Study Methodology
The stock market reactions to seasoned equity offering announcements are measured using daily stock returns. One testing strategy is to consider SIP activities and to clarify whether prices adjust to this news immediately or over a long time period [Shleifer (2000) ]. For that purpose, an event-study analysis is designed to identify abnormal returns within a well-specified event period. 38 Abnormal returns are calculated as the ex post observable returns' deviations from those returns which had occurred in the absence of SIP announcements.
Following the methodology of Armitage (1995), a market-adjusted model is used to isolate potential extraordinary effects associated with SIP announcements. We estimate abnormal returns for each security within our final sample by comparing 37 As mentioned above, we exclude IPOs of SOE. 38 The term "event period" is a synonym for "event window" within this paper. the security's returns which occurred around the announcement dates to the returns of a market index. Thereby, it is possible to estimate expected returns for given returns of the market index as follows: Since our research scope is directed towards examining whether joint cumulated effects are different from zero, we construct a portfolio comprising all securities as well as subsample portfolios according to different categories of SIPs, e.g., the issuances of secondary shares only. For each portfolio we test the null hypotheses whether the cross-sectional cumulated average abnormal returns (CAAR) in the event period are different form zero. For a sample of N securities CAARs are calculated as defined by equation (4) :
We draw statistical inferences for the different event-window cumulative average abnormal returns using a standard t-test statistic. However, Brown and Warner (1985) mention that an event might increase the variance, and as a consequence the null hypothesis is rejected too often. In order verify our test results, we implement the test statistic described by Böhmer, Masumeci and Poulsen (1991) and use the variance of the market model residuals to 39 In this paper, the terms "prediction error" and "abnormal return" are used as synonyms. standardize cumulated abnormal returns. Finaly, we also apply a non-parametric rank test according to Corrado (1989) , which is more powerful than the usual t-test.
IV. Descriptive Statistics
The sequence of share issuances for the full sample, except 14 announcements for which further information was not available, is shown in table 2.
The table provides evidence that most of the enterprises conduct up to three subsequent equity offerings. 79 firms offer shares at least once after their initial privatization step, whereas 16 out of 79 enterprises issue new shares within the first subsequent SIP only. Approximately 24% of the firms (32 firms) issue conduct two equity offerings and about 17% (23 firms) are divested in three or more stages.
Remarkably, in the majority of the SIPs (91 announcements or 67,91%) the government sells secondary shares only. We interpret this observation as an indication for limited growth opportunities because the companies obviously do not need additional equity. Around one of six SIPs is a primary share issuance. Table 3 shows the annual distribution of all equity offering announcements and the respective characteristics of the SIP: Most of the firms issue shares in the second half of our sample period, whereas many SIPs are conducted within a four-year time period (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) . Regarding the combined equity offerings, Table 3 shows that almost all announcements have been conducted between 1997 and 2000.
V. Market Reaction to Seasoned SIP Announcements
An aggregated view on the results of the event-study reveals remarkable patterns with respect to the speed of stock price adjustments to announcements of SIPs (see Figure 1) . The stock prices begin to decline prior to the announcement day and drop substantially at the day the information becomes public. In line with market efficiency hypothesis the CAARs remain stable thereafter.
Statistical inferences about these observations are provided by table 4.
The CAARs for the full sample range between -1.766% to -0.125%. The results show that investors perceive the announcement of a SIP of seconday, primary and combined shares as unfavourable information. 40 Nevertheless, compared to existing evidence provided for private companies' SEOs of up 40 See Akhigbe and Harikumar (1996) for a detailed discussion of stock price adjustments to SEO of all equity firms and D'Mello, Tawatnuntachai and Yaman (2003) for results for returns of firms that announced multiple primary SEOs.
to -3.30% the capital markets seem to be less concerned about the announcement of a subsequent equity offering within a privatization process. The implication of this result may be of a dual nature: On the one hand, an average decline of -0.691% (CAAR) implies a predominance of the negative effects associated with an announcement of a successive equity offering. On the other hand, these results could support the theory that positive privatization effects attenuate the negative market reaction.
A closer look at Table 5 reveals that omitting the announcements of primary and combined SIPs' the cumulated average market reaction for pure secondary SIPs is more negative. A pure sell-off of public ownership without proceeds for the listed comnpany to finance future growth signals at least to some extent an attractive share price level from the perspective of the seller. Yet, seasoned equity offerings, in general, are underpriced in order to compensate new shareholders for the uncertainty about the firm's value. Our results also indicate that the underpricing has already partially been incorporated into share prices the day the subsequent offering becomes public.
Comparable studies report initial returns associated with an SEO ranging between 2.2% for private SEOs and 9.4% for seasoned SIP [Jones, Megginson, Nash and Netter (1999) and Corwin (2003) ]. Moreover, Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) provide evidence for the United Kingdom that IPOs of private enterprises are less underpriced compared with the degrees of underpricing within a SIP. Jones, Megginson, Nash and Netter (1999) find mixed evidence for a greater underpricing of initial SIPs compared with IPOs. However, when we compare the difference between the negative market reaction associated with a SIP announcement and the degree of underpricing of IPOs with the differences observed for SIPs, we find some indication that SIPs are more detrimentally affected than equity offerings of private firms. Table 6 provides the results of our regression analysis. The four models are estimated using ordinary least squares, whereas White (1980) Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariances are applied to calculate t-statistics.
VI. Regression Results
The third question addresses that the market reaction to an announcement of a further SIP to be more negative for large SIPs. Previous research uses the relative offering size as a proxy for the price pressure hypothesis and finds a negative relationship between the relative offering size and the announcement reaction [Asquith and Mullins (1986) and Akhigbe and Harikumar (1996) ]. Accordingly, our two proxies for offer size (absolute and relative value of shares issued) have a negative sign and are significant on a 1% level. Beyond the potential price pressure we interpret this result as being consistent with the hypothesis that the issuer trades on superior information and sells shares at attractive price levels.
However, the capital market may also perceive an announcement of an issuance of a large proportion of the enterprises' equity as a signal of a populist oriented government. A populist government may prefer to achieve privatization proceeds in the short term, because their underlying motives may become public. In contrast, the regression results indicate a weak relation between the proportion of secondary shares issued and the announcements effects. In one of four models, the variable is significantly related to CARs only. While our above mentioned results show that the capital market is more concerned about a solely secondary share offering, the regression analysis provide at most weak evidence.
In line with the results of previous research, but conversely to Masulis and Korwar (1986) and Denis (1994) strong equity markets, i.e., stock market runups prior to the announcement date, are negatively related to announcement period CARs. In all four models, the proxy for market environment (Mean Return R i, (t-220;t-20) ) is significant, which confirms our hypothesis that the market reaction depends on market conditions. Furthermore, our second measure for hot equity markets, the standard deviation of the benchmark index during the estimation period, provides further support for this view. In contrast to our previous assumption, the sign of our two measures (Mean Return R i,(t-220;t-20) and the standard deviation of the benchmark index) do not indicate, that the market environment may reduce information costs. This observation, combined with the negative impact of selling a high proportion of secondary shares, supports the hypothesis that market participants are aware that the government may take advantage of a window of opportunity.
Focusing on the possible allocation of the issuance proceeds, we suggest that issuing firms with less growth opportunities are more likely to undertake investment projects with negative net present values. Therefore, we previously concluded that the existence of growth opportunities should attenuate the negative market reaction. As our proxy for growth opportunities, the market-to-book-ratio at the announcement date, is not significant, we are not able to support this hypothesis. Thus, the short-term market reaction seems to be independent from the existence of future growth opportunities.
If we take the SIP frequency into account, we find that the negative market reaction is less distinctive for enterprises that had prior equity offerings. This supports the view of D'Mello, Tawatnuntachai and Yaman (2003) that prevalently issuers experience lower information costs. Therefore, the advantageousness of conducting more SIPs, expressed in less pronounced negative abnormal returns, confirms the hypothesis that a higher information flow to the capital market via subsequent equity offerings reduces the uncertainty regarding a government's future policy as to interference.
Because politicians may perceive seasoned equity offerings as a means to obtain votes for subsequent elections, e.g., due to preferential allocations of stock at discounted prices, we suggest that companies which have experienced an increase in employees one year prior to the announcement of a SIP, may be subjected to governmental interests. The results of table 6 show that the coefficient of a percentage change in the number of employees is negative and significant at the 10% level in Model I and II. We interpret this observations as an only minor support for the hypothesis that politicians take advantage of a subsequent SIPs by increasing staff. Following research by Best, Payne and Howell (2003) we controlled for a firm's affiliation to selected industries, systematic risk and size. We find the coefficient for utilities to be significantly positive, whereas for firms of the financial services sector no relationship is observable. In accordance with D'Mello, Tawatnuntachai and Yaman (2003), regulated industries are characterized by less information asymmetry and utility firms can reduce adverse selection costs due to an information improvement at subsequent offerings. Given a revealing base of information, our result suggests that firms in the utility sector exhibit lower negative abnormal market reactions, which is in line with reduced information asymmetries.
Following previous research, we include the market value at the announcement day as a proxy for uncertainty and asymmetric information [Corwin (2003) and Laurin, Borardman and Vining (2004) ]. We assume that small firms experience more information asymmetries and greater uncertainty. However, given the coefficient's sign these firmspecific characteristics appear to have a negative influence on market reactions indicating that large firms are associated with larger information asymmetries. One possible explanation for this result might be that governmental interference is more likely in larger firms since a populist politician's intention is to raise privatization proceeds and to obtain the opportunity to redistribute firm value after privatization. Since the risk coefficients are statistically insignificant in both models, our analysis provides only weak evidence that announcement returns are dependent on a firm's systematic risk.
VII. Summary and Concluding Remarks
This paper examines the market reaction to announcements of subsequent equity offerings within a share issue privatization process. While previous research has shown a positive impact of privatization on performance due to transition of ownership, numerous studies document that the announcement of SEOs of non-state-owned enterprises is associated with substantial negative abnormal returns.
Analyzing a sample of 134 SIPs, which are conducted by 82 enterprises from 15 Western European countries during the 1979-2003 period we identify negative cumulated average abnormal announcement returns between -0.125% and -1.766%. Using different event-windows and comparing offerings of secondary shares with our full sample we find abnormal returns to be pronounced more negative. Relating our results to prior evidence form non-state-owned enterprises, our results show that the capital market seems to be less concerned of the announcement of a subsequent equity offering within a privatization process. However, these univariate comparisons do not account for firm, issue and market environment specific effects.
The regression results reveal that offering size has a significant negative impact on the cumulated abnormal returns indicating that the capital market perceives a high proportion of the company to be sold in a SIP as consistent with a signal for a populist government. Regarding subsequent equity offerings we find that the negative abnormal returns are less distinctive indicating that each equity issue is not an independent SIP. Moreover, the results for the market environment proxies are difficult to reconcile with existing theoretical explanations. Contrary to theoretical predictions, the market environment does not seem to reduce information costs. However, we assume this finding to be in line with the idea of a window of opportunity.Finally, we control for a firm's affiliation to selected industries, systematic risk and size. In addition to previous research, we can conclude that firms in the utility sector exhibit lower negative abnormal market reactions. This might be attributed to lower information asymmetries. Our findings have implications for the privatization process as a gradual sale of state-owned enterprises via several steps that mitigate negative valuation effects and therefore preserve shareholder value. 
